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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3162 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
 RICHARD CARABALLO-RODRIGUEZ, 
        Appellant                                    
 _____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2:08-cr-00328-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe  
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 9, 2015 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, SHWARTZ and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 2, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Richard Caraballo-Rodriguez was convicted of one count of conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of possession of more than five kilograms of 
cocaine with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  
This case presents the question of whether the District Court plainly erred in admitting 
portions of the expert testimony of a narcotics agent under Federal Rule of Evidence 
704(b).  We hold that the District Court did not plainly err in admitting the expert 
testimony, and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our 
disposition.  We have previously summarized the factual background of this matter in 
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc), and we 
assume familiarity with that decision.   
 Briefly, Caraballo-Rodriguez was arrested after he picked up two suitcases 
containing cocaine at the Philadelphia airport.  Prior to his arrival at the Philadelphia 
airport, Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents were alerted that he and co-
defendant Luis Deya-Diaz would arrive on a flight from Puerto Rico, having paid for 
their last-minute one-way tickets in cash and having no checked or carry-on luggage.  At 
the airport, DEA agents observed the two men meet a third man at the baggage carousel.  
Together, the three men collected multiple suitcases from the carousel, brought them to a 
car parked in the garage, and then entered a separate car parked nearby.  The DEA agents 
alerted state police to stop both vehicles.  After receiving consent to search one of the 
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vehicles, the state police discovered the suitcases, which contained several bricks of 
cocaine.  
 At Caraballo-Rodriguez’s trial, the Government called Alan Basewitz, a narcotics 
agent, to testify as an expert regarding the typical characteristics of drug couriers.  
Basewitz testified:  
  [Couriers] are trusted individuals.  The couriers, if you’re transporting a 
 significant amount, their addresses or families and information are known to the 
 person who is either coordinating or supplying.  The inverse is not true, in most 
 instances.  And they have to be trusted because of the amounts that they ferry back 
 and forth, both if it’s cash, depending on which direction you’re heading, or if it’s 
 drugs.  
 
  . . . Sometimes [couriers] are not told the exact type of drug.  Quite often 
 during my proffers and interviews and intelligence information through 
 conversations with informants and cooperators and other law enforcement and 
 most through my personal interactions with these individuals, they know it’s 
 drugs.  They may not know the type, depending on the group.  They may not know 
 the weight.  But, they know or should have known that it’s drugs.  
 
  There is an exception to that, when there is what’s known as the blind mule. 
 But, the blind mule only occurs, in my expertise and experience, in situations 
 that’s dissimilar from those that are present today.  
 
Supplemental Appendix (“Supp. App.”) 622-23. 
 In addition to Basewitz, the Government called Deya-Diaz as a witness, who 
testified that although he did not initially know the contents of the suitcases, once he 
picked them up, he “guess[ed]” they contained drugs based on their weight.  Supp. App. 
428-29.  Deya-Diaz added, “[c]ommon sense, drugs. Who else would take five thousand 
dollars to pick up a suitcase full of clothes?”  Supp. App. 435.  The Government also 
introduced phone records indicating that both Deya-Diaz and Caraballo-Rodriguez had 
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been in significant contact with the same phone number in the days preceding their flight 
to Philadelphia.   
 After his conviction, Caraballo-Rodriguez filed a post-trial motion for acquittal.  
The District Court granted the motion, holding that the Government’s evidence was 
insufficient to support an inference that Caraballo-Rodriguez knew the suitcases 
contained drugs as opposed to other contraband.  The Government appealed the District 
Court’s decision.  In an en banc decision, we vacated the District Court’s order and held 
that the Government’s evidence — which included “Caraballo-Rodriguez’s travel plans, 
Deya-Diaz’s testimony, the phone records [of Deya-Diaz and Caraballo-Rodriguez], 
Agent Basewitz’s expert testimony, and the jury’s own common sense” — was sufficient 
to support the conviction.  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 434.  
 After remand, the District Court sentenced Caraballo-Rodriguez to the statutory 
minimum term of imprisonment.  Caraballo-Rodriguez timely appealed.  On appeal, 
Caraballo-Rodriguez challenges the admission of the Government’s expert testimony.  
II. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.      
 As Caraballo-Rodriguez did not object to the expert testimony at trial, we review 
the admission of the expert testimony for plain error.  To establish plain error, Caraballo-
Rodriguez must show that (1) the District Court erred; (2) the error was clear or obvious, 
rather than subject to reasonable dispute; and (3) the error affected the appellant’s 
substantial rights, which in the ordinary course means affected the outcome of the 
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proceedings.  United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010); United States v. Tai, 
750 F.3d 309, 313-14 (3d Cir. 2014).  If all three elements are established, the Court may 
exercise its discretion to award relief.  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 
(1993).  That discretion should be exercised only in cases where the error “seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 
2013).  
III. 
 Caraballo-Rodriguez argues that Basewitz’s testimony is inadmissible under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).  Under Rule 704, an expert witness in a criminal case 
“must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state 
or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.”  Fed. R. 
Evid. 704(b).  However, “[e]xpert testimony is admissible if it merely supports an 
inference or conclusion that the defendant did or did not have the requisite mens rea, so 
long as the expert does not draw the ultimate inference or conclusion for the jury and the 
ultimate inference or conclusion does not necessarily follow from the testimony.”  United 
States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and alteration 
omitted).  
 Caraballo-Rodriguez challenges Basewitz’s testimony because “‘if the jury found 
that Caraballo-Rodriguez shared the typical attributes of couriers, the direct inference 
from Basewitz’s testimony would be that he, like all couriers, knew or should have 
known that his suitcase contained drugs.’”  Caraballo-Rodriguez Br. 16-17 (quoting the 
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District Court’s post-trial acquittal order in United States v. Cordero, 815 F. Supp. 2d 
821, 845 (E.D. Pa. 2011)).  In support of this argument, Caraballo-Rodriguez points to 
Watson, 260 F.3d 301.  In Watson, we held that under Rule 704, experts can testify 
“concerning the modus operandi of individuals involved in drug trafficking” or “the 
common practices of drug dealers.”  Id. at 308-09.  We noted, however, that “Rule 704(b) 
may be violated when the prosecutor’s question is plainly designed to elicit the expert’s 
testimony about the mental state of the defendant or when the expert triggers the 
application of Rule 704(b) by directly referring to the defendant’s intent, mental state, or 
mens rea.”  Id. at 309 (citation omitted).  Such a violation may occur if the prosecution 
makes “repeated invocation of the word ‘intent’” in questioning the expert.  Id.  But we 
have also found no such violation when a prosecutor’s questions were “hypothetical, 
rather than specific, questions regarding the intent of individual defendants on trial,” and 
when “no evidence was presented that [the expert] had any direct relationship with the 
investigation or the defendants and, therefore, there was no potential for the jury to 
conclude that [the expert] had any special insight into the thoughts or intent of the 
defendants.”  United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony suggesting that the 
facts of the case were “consistent” with an “intent to distribute”).  
 The District Court did not commit an error when it admitted Basewitz’s testimony 
that in his experience through proffers and interviews, couriers often “know or should 
have known that it’s drugs.”  Supp. App. 623.  As in Davis, the prosecutor’s questions 
were not plainly designed to elicit testimony about the mental state of the defendant.  The 
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prosecutor asked Basewitz:  “Now, with regard to the couriers, how are they recruited?”  
Supp. App. 621.  In asking this question, the prosecutor did not reference Caraballo-
Rodriguez; nor did the prosecutor use words or phrases (such as “intent” or “knowledge”) 
that could be reasonably interpreted as seeking to elicit testimony regarding Caraballo-
Rodriguez’s mental state.  Similarly, Basewitz did not refer to Caraballo-Rodriguez in his 
testimony.  Instead, he spoke in general terms about his personal interactions with drug 
couriers other than Caraballo-Rodriguez.  He also testified that he was not, in any way, 
involved in this particular investigation and trial.  Basewitz framed his testimony in such 
a way that supported an inference that Caraballo-Rodriguez had the requisite knowledge 
about the contents of the suitcases, but that “ultimate inference or conclusion does not 
necessarily follow from [his] testimony.”  Watson, 260 F.3d at 309 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, the District Court did not commit plain error because admission of 
Basewitz’s testimony was proper.1  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
                                              
1 Even if there were a clear or obvious error, Caraballo-Rodriguez has not satisfied the 
third prong of the plain error standard — that any such error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings.  As we noted in our en banc decision, the Government’s evidence included 
more than just Basewitz’s testimony; other evidence supporting the conviction included 
Caraballo-Rodriguez’s travel plans, Deya-Diaz’s testimony, similar phone records of 
Caraballo-Rodriguez and Deya-Diaz, and the jury’s own common sense.  See Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 434. 
